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Over the years, two things have become evident to us as philanthropic leaders.  
First, that philanthropy becomes exponentially more difficult when combined 
with disasters.  Second, with the appropriate resources, philanthropy on a 
national scale should be able to become a national powerhouse in disaster pre-
paredness, response and recovery. 
In the first few days after Hurricane Katrina hit 
Louisiana and breached New Orleans’ Industrial Canal, 
the city began to fill up like a bathtub and 1.5 million 
people fled the Crescent City and other communities 
on the Gulf Coast. Seemingly overnight, the popula-
tion of Baton Rouge, the capital, increased by more 
than 50%. As our family and friends throughout the 
Southern parishes of Louisiana and in Mississippi 
began what would turn out to be a multi-year struggle 
with the enormity of the storm and its aftermath, a 
small group of colleagues in the foundation com-
munity, entrusted with the management and effective 
deployment of our donors’ funds, communicated with 
each other in extremely urgent terms. We were intently 
focused on the farthest horizon: How would the Gulf 
Coast recover from this devastating event?  What could 
our organizations do?
As a consultant to the largest family foundation in the 
state, located in Baton Rouge, I immediately contacted 
my trustees and obtained a commitment to start a 
$1 million fund for New Orleans. I then called John 
Davies, President of the Baton Rouge Area Foundation 
(BRAF).  I said, “May I come over?  I have money and 
we must start a fund for NOLA.” I will never forget 
John’s reply: “Come now, I need your brain more than 
the money.”  John and I, along with associates at the 
Huey Wilson Foundation (also of Baton Rouge) and 
Lamar Advertising, spent an entire day talking with 
each other.  Within a day, the four organizations had 
each donated $1 million to help respond to Katrina’s 
devastating effects. As it turned out, figuring out a 
sensible and effective way to help would prove to be 
a much greater challenge for all of us than obtaining 
funding from our generous donors.
With the city of New Orleans in chaos and the federal 
and state government not sure what to do (and not 
doing it very well!) the initial $4 million went to work, 
enabling BRAF to house the Greater New Orleans 
Foundation and several other foundations and out of 
town grantors.  Soon our initial $4 million stake had 
grown to $45 million as national donors contributed 
to our fund.  The Louisiana philanthropic sector, out 
of necessity and sheer will, had become a force that 
kick-started a broad range of recovery efforts when 
everyday leaders fled and the bureaucracy was 
paralyzed.  Through our donors’ support, philan-
thropic organizations conducted shelter assessments, 
performed some of the earliest post-Katrina damage 
assessment tours of NOLA, engaged the International 
Rescue Committee for their first ever job on U.S. soil, 
rebuilt the NOLA restaurant community, and gave out 
$300,000 to help families with lost wages and who 
had incurred added expenses for hosting families.  The 
philanthropic sector also set up the Louisiana Recovery 
Authority, a coordinating body within the governor’s 
office that oversaw the entire recovery enterprise and 
managed the federal funding streams as well as a 
number of private revenue streams. In short, philan-
thropy was a “gap filler” no more.  Philanthropy was in 
the wheelhouse!
Other path breaking disaster response efforts arose




from those desperate discussions at a moment of 
extreme crisis.  Our grant-making changed case 
management policy at the federal level and created 
“Encourage,” a mental health program for Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that wasn’t covered 
in the Stafford Act. Philanthropy led to the creation 
of Louisiana Speaks, a smart growth program that 
convened community residents and engaged them in 
planning efforts, and that hired architects and planners 
who guided the redevelopment of ten square blocks 
in St. Bernard Parish.  Philanthropy also revitalized a 
dormant Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters 
(VOAD), created the first ever tri-state VOAD among 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and played an 
important role in the Road Home Program.  After 
Hurricanes Ike, Gustav and Isaac, and the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, philanthropy led the way with the cre-
ation of the Water Institute, a public-private partnership 
dedicated to the study of water as an asset for coastal 
protection and restoration.  Philanthropy cultivated 
relationships and established networks with national 
political leaders, Washington think tanks, and major 
national businesses and civic leaders to keep disaster 
preparedness in the public eye even when no disasters 
were occurring.  
Since Hurricane Katrina, whenever a major disaster 
has struck a community anywhere in the country, one 
of us from that initial group in Baton Rouge has been 
called upon to offer advice, to answer the question, 
“What can we, donors and the philanthropic sector as 
a whole, do in addition to writing checks?”  This hap-
pened during Hurricanes Gustav, Ike, Irene, Isaac, and 
Sandy.  It happened after the Joplin tornado, and after 
the Midwest floods.  This past summer it happened 
after the “super derecho” of violent thunderstorms that 
cut a 700-mile path of devastation from the Midwest 
to the Mid-Atlantic States.  These calls also have come 
from government officials, community leaders and key 
representatives of the non-profit and business sectors.  
The common themes focus upon how we recover, how 
we can put together public and private money and 
effort, and what we can tell donors who are compelled 
to contribute.
Over the years, two things have become evident to 
us as philanthropic leaders.  First, that philanthropy 
becomes exponentially more difficult when com-
bined with disasters.  Second, with the appropriate 
resources, philanthropy on a national scale should 
be able to become a national powerhouse in disaster 
preparedness, response and recovery.  By convening, 
coordinating, compelling and leveraging broad cross-
sections of society, philanthropy on a national scale 
should be able to wield its power and have the same 
kind of influence that the Gulf Coast philanthropies 
had in the Katrina response and recovery.  For both of 
these reasons, and so that donors never again need to 
wonder to whom they should turn for advice and what 
they should do when a disaster occurs, we founded 
the Center for Disaster Philanthropy.  It was born, in 
spirit, that day in Baton Rouge when Katrina and its 
effects were still swirling about us. In many ways, this 
document on the future trends in disaster philanthropy 
is the outgrowth of everything we have learned (and 
are still learning) since those tumultuous days in 
August 2005. Four key lessons serve as underpinnings 
for many of this report’s recommendations:
 First, it is critical to engage interested parties in a 
discussion when they are not in the middle of a 
disaster.  It is extremely hard to network and plan 
when people and organizations are focused on 
sheer survival, and many of their administrative 
and fiscal systems have been disrupted.  Disaster 
philanthropy has to begin before the event.
 Second, it is important to look at disasters through 
a “cross-sectoral perspective.”  Our greatest 
successes came from learning from each other. 
We brought together people from business, policy 
sectors, academia, philanthropy, and 
cont’d
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       from local, state, and federal government 
agencies.
 Third, disaster philanthropy needs to focus – first 
– on the assets and innate resilience of disaster 
prone communities.  This means becoming 
involved in preparedness and mitigation efforts, 
in planning and networking before events occur, 
and understanding the inherent strengths of a 
community so that re-imagining that strength in 
a post-disaster setting can become a key recovery 
goal.
 Fourth, much the way our colleagues in medical 
research consider how to move from “bench to 
bedside,” taking what is learned in a laboratory 
to a patient’s side, we need to turn our “lessons 
learned” into creative actions and innovative inter-
ventions.  From a philanthropist’s perspective, that 
could be as simple as maintaining the institutional
memory and structure to apply past successes to 
future threats.
 
We live in the most generous country in the world and 
we don’t like to see others suffer.  That humanitarian 
motive is what drives so much of disaster philan-
thropy.  But then this largesse falls off abruptly after 
media coverage ends, even though there are many 
ways to give throughout the whole cycle of a disaster.  
Philanthropy may be its most effective as a source of 
risk capital and “patient capital.”  Disaster philanthropy 
is not just about rebuilding homes, although that is 
certainly critical. It is also about addressing many of 
the social ills and vulnerabilities exposed by a disaster, 
the very root causes that we, as philanthropists, work 
on every day. I hope that this guide for potential 
donors inspires you to broaden your thinking, and 
informs your philanthropic efforts.
Lori Bertman 
President, Irene W. and C.B. Pennington Foundation
Co-founder and Chairman of the Board, Center for Disaster Philanthropy




Donors are essential sources of support for disaster recovery in two  
distinct categories of communities.
 Post-disaster communities that have stabilized to the point of thinking about “getting back to 
normal” and not merely getting by day to day (page 6). 
 Communities that have not experienced a disaster recently or ever, but because they clearly are in 
harm’s way, want to establish mechanisms to help them jump start the process of recovery if the 
worst should happen (page 6).
Seven major trends will shape and define the political and economic envi-
ronment in which donors confront requests for disaster-related assistance.
1. There likely will be less federal money to support recovery than in prior years (page 8).
2. “Recovery” as a discipline and area of professional specialization has begun to “mature” or “come 
of age,” which means it potentially may become more bureaucratized and formulaic (page 8).  
3. A major long-term reduction in the amount of catastrophic risk that households, businesses and 
the public sector have transferred to the private insurance market will result in much greater losses 
borne by communities when disasters strike (page 9).
4. Decaying and under-maintained infrastructure is a time bomb facing communities that experience 
disasters (page 12).
5. Many communities may lack an adequate understanding of their exposures (page 12). 
6. Disasters are followed by a very short window when communities can attempt to envision and 
embark on a path towards alternative futures (page 13).  
7. With the exception of Hurricane Katrina, the United States has not experienced a true megadisaster 
(page 13).
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Donors can support long-term recovery--both before and after disasters--in 
diverse ways that suit diverse donor missions, philosophies and styles.
 Build trust and break down barriers among stakeholders (page 18). 
     Promote stakeholders’ understanding of their risks and exposures (page 19).
 Help state and local actors across the public, private and non-profit sectors integrate into the new  
National Disaster Recovery Framework (page 19).
 Enable interested local, state and federal parties to maximize the resources brought to bear (page 20).
 Provide recovery coaching for local leadership (page 21).
 Support catalytic recovery projects and enterprises (page 23).
 Strengthen and build networks of NGOs and Faith-Based Organizations active in recovery (page 23).
 Provide practice and thought leadership for recovery as a critical component of disaster philanthropy  
(page 26).
Donors can promote disaster recovery by helping communities develop the  
critical components of a long-term recovery process (page 14).
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introduction
This paper examines how donors can support stabilized communities that 
are beginning to think about “getting back to normal.” Donors should also be 
prepared to support vulnerable but proactive communities that wish to plan to 
recover from a disaster that may never occur.
When disasters strike, Americans are very generous, 
donating billions to aid individuals and families in 
need. In the years since Hurricane Katrina made 
landfall along the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, more 
than $6.5 billion has been provided to the region’s 
residents, businesses, and institutions through philan-
thropic giving.1  
The vast majority of disaster-related donations comes 
from individuals2 in the initial days and weeks when a 
disaster’s impacts are fresh in our minds and images 
are still appearing on the evening news.3 Charities 
understand this, which is why many of them issue 
appeals and advertise their disaster response efforts in 
that early window of time before the reporters and film 
crews pack up and go home. Although this strategy 
can maximize aggregate donations, the risk is that 
too much money gets concentrated in time and with 
charitable organizations that are (like most federal and 
state disaster assistance) legitimately focused on the 
immediate provision of emergency medical care, food, 
shelter, and clothing rather than on longer-term issues. 
After all, it takes time to discover the full extent of a 
disaster’s impacts and response and recovery needs.  
The task of rebuilding communities, economies, and 
individual’s lives can take years, even a decade or 
more. 
This guidance paper goes above and beyond what 
donors can learn--or already have learned--from a 
handful of excellent guides developed by the philan-
thropic community since Hurricane Katrina.4 Much 
of this literature on “disaster philanthropy” has been 
directed at the most effective ways for donors and 
their agents to deliver assistance during unfolding 
crises and the immediate aftermath, and how donors 
and their agents can help provide food, water, clothing, 
shelter, sanitation, health care and self-governance for 
masses of displaced and traumatized people.  Here, we 
discuss innovative and under-appreciated ways that 
donors can help American communities recover and 
rebuild resiliently from disasters. The goal is to give 
donors a fresh perspective on supporting local efforts 
not only to rebuild from disasters already sustained, 
but also to prepare to recover from potential disasters. 
In both cases, there are opportunities for donors to 
directly fund, or pool and leverage funds for a variety 
of recovery and rebuilding activities, programs and 
services.
By “donor,” we mean the individuals and organizations 
that provide their own funds, marshal funds contrib-
uted by others, and disburse or administer such funds. 
“Donors” includes the entire spectrum of people and 
organizations involved in generating and distributing 
discretionary, philanthropic spending: wealthy indi-
viduals and families, family foundations and offices, 
community foundations, large public foundations, 
corporate social responsibility departments and 
corporate foundations.
This paper looks at the post-disaster recovery and 
rebuilding needs of communities that donors can sup-
port. This would include disaster-stricken communities 
that have stabilized to the point where they have the 
physical, economic, political, and psychological where-
withal to begin thinking about the process of “getting 
back to normal” or alternatively, attaining some new 
and different steady state in which residents would 
feel safe, secure, emotionally attached to their changed 
environment, and accepting of their changed life cir-
cumstances. Few disaster-stricken community officials, 
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businesses, and residents – the army of recovery 
rebuilders – have prior disaster recovery experiences 
and quite often lack the necessary resources to plan 
and execute such a complex and long-term process. 
This paper also considers communities that have not 
yet actually experienced a disaster or haven’t had one 
recently, but are clearly in harm’s way.  Around the 
United States, several states and localities in this cat-
egory have begun to take the prudent step of putting 
in place mechanisms that would help them jump start 
the process of recovery if the worst were to happen.  
For example, the State of Florida now mandates that 
203 coastal counties and municipalities create “post-
disaster redevelopment plans” and has provided a 
guidebook to assist in that process.5 In 2008, the City 
and County of San Francisco initiated a “Citywide Post-
disaster Resilience and Recovery Initiative” that “seeks 
to address comprehensive advanced planning to accel-
erate post-disaster recovery.”6 As will be described 
later, the U.S. National Disaster Recovery Framework 
urges all vulnerable communities to consider taking 
such actions.
This paper assumes that its readers already know the 
terms under which they are ready, willing and able to 
fund this sphere of philanthropy, or are in the process 
of answering that question. Therefore it does not 
address a range of strategic, tactical and operational 
issues amply covered in the previously cited literature.  
Some of those issues include contingency planning 
for rapid reallocation of budget capacity from existing 
priorities to unpredictable disasters; compliance with 
international humanitarian aid standards; stepping 
outside of the donor’s mission to fund disaster-related 
assistance; relying upon recommendations and the 
local “intelligence” of parties with more local pres-
ence than the donor; having different application, 
monitoring and reporting processes for disaster-related 
assistance; participation through donor collabora-
tions; distribution of donor’s total disaster funding 
commitment between immediate humanitarian aid 
and longer-term recovery support; and the kinds of 
measurement and evaluation the donor requires. 
In preparing this guidance paper, Columbia 
University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness 
(NCDP) performed extensive background research 
addressing two major developments in federal disaster 
recovery policy and their implications for disaster 
philanthropy. One is the National Disaster Recovery 
Framework (NDRF), the other proposed amendments 
(currently stalled in Congress) of the Stafford Act, 
which is the primary statute that governs the federal 
government’s response to most major disasters.  This 
research documented the broad conceptual param-
eters of the NDRF and its limited operational deploy-
ment to date, as well as the strengths and weaknesses 
of bills intended to enhance the utility of the Stafford 
Act. This guidance paper builds upon that research, 
but treats the Stafford Act and the NDRF as just two 
of numerous important contextual factors bearing on 
disaster philanthropy and donors’ decision-making.
The remainder of this paper contains three sections.  
The first describes seven major elements of the 
environment confronting donors who may be con-
templating funding long-term disaster recovery assis-
tance.  Although the correspondence is not perfect, 
the challenges facing donors largely overlap with 
the challenges facing communities that experience a 
disaster or are planning for how to deal with a disaster 
they hope will never occur.  The second section briefly 
discusses a theoretical model of long-term disaster 
recovery that has emerged from prior NCDP research.  
The paper utilizes this model to organize the varied 
activities, programs and services that donors can 
support, and to explain how they relate to a com-
prehensive approach to long-term disaster recovery.  
Finally, this paper discusses the kinds of donor support 
that NCDP believes would have the greatest beneficial 
impact.
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introduction
cont’d
Donors contemplating providing support for locally-based efforts to recover from 
major disasters need to consider the following issues:
There likely will be less federal money 
to support recovery.
Although one ultimately must look to the federal 
budget and the annual appropriations acts to deter-
mine a trend in federal support for disaster recovery, 
the current economic and fiscal crisis environment 
has provided other compelling indications that federal 
assistance will at best hold steady and more likely, 
decline. 
The proposed amendments to the Stafford Act, 
although they are stalled in this session of Congress, 
reflected legislators’ sentiment that it should become 
harder for disasters to qualify for federal assistance.  
Those amendments proposed a new “worst case” 
incident level, with at least one billion dollars of esti-
mated damages, to be called a “Catastrophic Disaster,” 
and stipulated that a presidential declaration of a 
“Catastrophic Disaster” could not become effective 
unless an independent panel previously had rendered 
a non-binding recommendation on that subject.  The 
bill also would have restricted the availability of 
supplemental appropriations of community develop-
ment block grants to “Catastrophic Disasters,” denying 
that source of non-Stafford Act funding to communi-
ties that had sustained anything less than one billion of 
damage.  
One of the major tenets of the National Disaster 
Recovery Framework is that the federal government, 
while in effect imposing a mandate on communities to 
prepare for disasters,  will not provide any funds for 
that purpose above and beyond the minimal planning 
and preparedness grants it currently offers. When it 
comes to disaster recovery, NDRF is clear that the 
current Stafford Act is as good as it’s going to get.  
Finally, planners and local government officials have 
observed that FEMA is adhering more rigidly to the 
formal process requirements for declaring an incident 
to be either an “Emergency” or “Major Disaster,” the 
current threshold determination to be eligible for 
Stafford Act assistance.  This increases the burden on 
impacted communities to demonstrate that they’ve 
suffered a sufficient aggregate level of losses to satisfy 
the Stafford Act’s (and related regulations’) threshold.
“Recovery” as a discipline and area of 
professional specialization has begun 
to “mature” or “come of age,” which 
means it potentially may become more 
bureaucratized and formulaic. 
 This is most evident in FEMA’s extensive efforts to roll 
out the NDRF on a nationwide basis and impress upon 
states and local governments that the federal govern-
ment is changing the way it deals with disaster-stricken 
communities beyond the immediate crisis period.  Just 
as states and localities were forced to adapt to and 
Proposed changes in federal law 
would make it harder for large 
disasters to qualify for federal 
assistance.
the environment & challenges   FACING DONORS IN 2013 AND BEYOND
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conform their own emergency management systems 
with the National Incident Management System and 
the National Response Framework starting in February 
2003, they now will have to embrace and master a 
new (and just barely emerging) set of functions, roles, 
relationships, policies and rules in order to maximize 
whatever recovery support the federal government will 
make available. 
NDRF will create a number of significant structural 
changes in the process whereby a disaster-stricken 
community applies for and obtains federal assistance 
for recovery.  For example, federal recovery funds 
won’t flow to a disaster site until there is a joint state 
and federal recovery plan approved by FEMA. As a key 
step in implementing the NDRF, FEMA has appointed 
the high level regional officials mandated by that 
document, known as “federal disaster recovery coor-
dinators.” FEMA will also appoint at least one national 
“Mitigation Advisor” pursuant to the Interagency 
Operational Plan for NDRF.  The agency already has 
debuted drafts of new guidance documents to define 
intra-federal and intergovernmental relations in 
disaster recovery and retained the American Planning 
Association (APA) to update a well-known classic book 
on post-disaster recovery to reflect NDRF concepts.  
APA is considering establishing an internal hazards 
and disaster management section, and certificate and 
degree programs in “recovery” also may appear soon.
All of these developments signal the emerging pri-
macy of state and local recovery plans and planning 
processes and the professionalization and potential 
bureaucratization of recovery. This trend has the 
potential to increase awareness of and political sup-
port for recovery planning as a routine function of 
local government and of other local stakeholders such 
as the non-profit, faith-based and business sectors. 
If that occurs, and recovery preparedness becomes 
as deeply-ingrained in vulnerable communities as 
emergency preparedness has become, communities 
potentially could be much better prepared to address 
recovery than they have been historically.
Alternatively, federal encouragement of state and 
local structure and processes for recovery planning 
and preparedness, coupled with an absence of 
federal resources to support the work, could be a 
burden rather than a boon to states and localities.  
Furthermore, there is some concern that over time, 
bureaucratized “recovery” could become compartmen-
talized or forced into silos.  Much as some communi-
ties have hired consultants to develop cookie-cutter 
hazard mitigation plans in order to quality for grants 
under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, developing 
long-term recovery plans also could degenerate into a 
“check the box” exercise. 
A major long-term reduction in the 
amount of catastrophic risk that 
households, businesses and the public 
sector have transferred to the private 
insurance market will result in much 
greater losses borne by communities 
when disasters strike.
In many parts of the U.S. that are vulnerable to 
catastrophic disasters, particularly the hurricane 
and earthquake-prone states on the East and West 
Coasts, homeowners and renters have far less, or 
more restrictive, insurance coverage to help them 
rebuild destroyed homes or replace possessions when 
disasters happen. In the economic downturn of recent 
years, many businesses in these same regions have
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reduced their insurance limits and thus have fewer 
outside resources to help repair catastrophic damage 
to their facilities, replace destroyed inventory and 
compensate for business interruptions caused by 
these hazards.  Similarly, cash-strapped local govern-
ment agencies—driven by legal mandates to balance 
their budgets and possibly by the belief the federal 
government ultimately will bear the costs of disasters-
-have opted to reduce their insurance coverages and 
decrease their coverage values from full replacement 
cost to depreciated value (often called “actual cash 
value”).  Consequently, they will absorb an even 
greater proportion of the losses caused by damage to 
expensive public buildings and infrastructure.  Thus, 
either deliberately or unaware, almost all sectors of 
society are retaining a significantly greater portion 
of the risk of loss from catastrophic events instead of 
transferring that risk to private insurers.  Consequently, 
disaster-impacted communities will likely sustain 
continuously growing gaps between loss levels and 
private insurance coverage.
Many factors account for this.  As a result of sustaining 
many years of record losses from natural hazards 
(See Figure 1, below), the insurance industry has 
attempted in various ways to achieve a more favorable 
balance between the premiums it expects to earn on 
catastrophe-related policies and the claims it expects 
to pay on such policies (particularly for earthquakes 
and hurricanes).  Many catastrophic related coverage 
terms have higher minimum deductibles and/or lower 
limits than previously. Also, an “all perils” policy - 
covering floods and earthquakes along with wind and 
fire - may be less available in some regions, such as 
the central U.S., than in years past or may be avail-
able only at substantially higher premiums.  In some 
states, insurance companies have completely stopped 
offering coverage for losses caused by specific perils, 
resulting in some well-known actions by the states to 
create state-backed insurance programs, such as the 
California Earthquake Authority and Florida Hurricane 
Catastrophe Fund. 
 
In addition, over the past 20 years, the insurance 
industry has increasingly utilized much more sophis-
ticated and granular catastrophic risk models that 
enable insurers to better assess risks based on varying 
location and construction type, and to adjust their 
pricing (i.e., premium rates) accordingly.  Some insur-
ance companies use these models to give credit in 
their premium rates for various types of loss mitigation 
measures that individual homeowners, governments 
and businesses have taken (e.g., installing storm 
shutters or elevating critical electrical and HVAC equip-
ment).  However, the industry’s risk and pricing models 
generally do not incorporate community-level factors 
and attributes such as the existence of zoning, building 
codes, or community engagement processes. 
These changes cumulatively have made coverage 
for catastrophic losses much less available in the 
insurance marketplace, and more expensive and less 
attractive to would-be purchasers when it is available.  
As a result, some consumers, businesses and govern-
ment decide to take a gamble and go uncovered for 
catastrophic losses, or to buy less coverage than they
Individuals, families, businesses, 
non-profits and local government 
all will absorb an increasing pro-
portion of catastrophic losses, due 
to carrying less private insurance. 
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are likely to need in a catastrophic event.  In all likeli-
hood, a certain number of people, governments and 
businesses that carry some kind of property insurance 
assume that they are covered for catastrophic losses 
from all perils when in fact they are not.
Figure 1 illustrates the worldwide trend of rising 
disaster costs over a 30-year period, and the corol-
lary rise in the amount of uncovered financial 
losses.7 Although the ratio of uncovered to covered 
losses actually has declined over this three-decade 
timeframe, from approximately 8:1 to 4:1, absolute 
dollar losses have escalated tremendously.  This may 
represent gains in mitigation efforts to insure against 
losses in high-risk areas, but the size and growth of 
uncovered losses suggest a growing recovery chal-
lenge.  This difference between covered and uncovered 
losses reflects the absolute minimum investment 
required for affected areas to return to pre-event 
conditions, much less build back to a better or higher 
standard.  Furthermore, what this trend line cannot 
capture are those disaster consequences not so easily 
monetized – diminished physical and mental health 
among an affected citizenry, loss of a sense of com-
munity and attachment to place, environmental degra-
dation, or large-scale social disruptions or population 
displacements.
Natural catastrophes worldwide 1980 - 2011: Overall and insured losses with trend
Figure 1
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Decaying and under-maintained  
infrastructure is a time bomb facing 
communities that experience disasters.
Since 1998, the American Society of Civil Engineers 
(ASCE) has published a periodic “report card” on the 
state of America’s infrastructure.  These reports have 
assigned a grade to various major classes of infra-
structure based upon current condition, the degree 
of deferred maintenance, public safety, resilience and 
other factors. In addition, the report card provides 
ASCE’s recommended level of investment in infra-
structure over the next five years in order to remedy 
noted deficiencies.  ASCE’s most recent report card, in 
2009, assigned grades of “C” to “D-“ to fifteen classes 
of infrastructure, and estimated that America needs 
to spend $2.2 trillion over the next five years.8  These 
estimates do not reflect investments needed to adapt 
to climate change.
Both private insurance for infrastructure damage 
and the Stafford Act’s “Public Assistance” program 
for repairing or replacing infrastructure cover the 
protected party only up to the value of infrastructure 
in its pre-existing condition.  For many cash-strapped 
states, municipalities and special districts, years of 
deferred maintenance may result in their infrastructure 
systems already being severely worn and depreciated 
at the time a disaster strikes.  Thus the full replacement 
cost of damaged infrastructure may well exceed the 
amount of funding that will be available from external 
sources at the exact moment when a disaster has 
severely impaired the jurisdiction’s own revenues and 
reserves.  Vulnerable communities may be ignorant 
and/or in denial about the magnitude of their potential 
exposure from a disaster. Furthermore, upon sus-
taining a major hit to their infrastructure, local officials 
may become so focused on remedying the public 
sector’s own direct losses that their capacity (i.e., their 
own time, energy, and concentration, and that of their 
staff) to address broader recovery issues may be badly 
diminished. 
Many communities may lack an  
adequate understanding of their  
exposures.
Besides not fully appreciating the extent of their 
infrastructure deterioration or the degree to which 
their households, businesses and local governments 
have retained the risk of catastrophic loss, many com-
munities may not have a sufficient baseline analysis of 
their local and regional economies to correctly gauge 
the nature of the economic damage a disaster has 
caused. Such communities will be sorely challenged 
to articulate what needs to be “fixed” or restored 
after the crisis is over.  Understanding the drivers of 
a regional economy is complicated under ideal condi-
tions, but communities that do not have a reasonably 
clear picture of what has changed post-disaster are 
likely to have difficulty coming up with meaningful 
plans, offering incentives to attract or keep businesses, 
making infrastructure and other public sector invest-
ments, or doing those things in an effective sequence. 
Unintentional or willful ignorance 
of infrastructure vulnerabilities, 
insurance coverage gaps and 
economic drivers can turn a major 
problem into a catastrophe.
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Disasters are followed by a very short 
window when communities can  
attempt to envision and embark on a 
path towards alternative futures.
During this window of community solidarity and 
relative absence of political friction, there is at best 
an equal balance between the desire for speed of 
recovery and the desire for deliberation. People and 
organizations are at least willing to consider new 
restrictions on where and how property owners may 
rebuild, modifications in permitted land uses, and the 
use of taxpayer-funded subsidies to encourage certain 
types of development.  However, as planners Robert 
Olshansky and Laurie Johnson state so aptly, “speed is 
difficult to resist.”9  The desire to rebuild quickly—and 
largely as things were before the disaster—inevitably 
overwhelms calls for rebuilding smarter and better, 
with mitigation and with less risk.  Olshansky and 
Johnson conclude that given this reality, “the appro-
priate question is how to deliberate and how to plan 
more efficiently—get more planning done in less 
time—in order to achieve as much improvement as 
possible…”10
 
With the exception of Hurricane Ka-
trina, the United States has not  
experienced a true megadisaster.
Many of America’s major metropolitan areas are 
vulnerable to large-scale catastrophic disasters 
comparable to, or even exceeding the scale of losses 
sustained in the Gulf Coast region due to Hurricane 
Katrina.  Miami, Tampa, Houston and New York City are 
among the larger coastal cities that have not been hit 
recently by a major hurricane.  Seattle, San Francisco, 
Los Angeles, San Diego and Memphis similarly 
face the risk of a catastrophic earthquake.  Scientific 
research suggests that large-scale disasters are long 
overdue in many regions of the country.  In the future, 
we should expect to see disasters that cause damages 
and losses that will dwarf those from domestic disas-
ters since Katrina.  These events will cause widespread 
and systemic failures of infrastructure and even 
possibly disruptions of social order.
Even before hurricane Katrina, the federal government 
had begun to organize high profile studies, planning 
exercises and drills to highlight and better understand 
the risks associated with catastrophic events.  Some 
of these efforts have focused on a catastrophic hur-
ricane in New Orleans, major earthquakes on the San 
Andreas and New Madrid faults, an earthquake and 
tsunami in the Cascadia subduction zone, and dirty 
bombs and improvised nuclear devices in major cities. 
But much more research, analysis and open discussion 
are needed regarding “how bad can it get.”
The desire to rebuild quickly and 
largely as before the disaster inevi-
tably overwhelms calls to rebuild 
smarter, better and with less risk.
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In 2010, NCDP conducted a study of pre-disaster long 
term recovery planning in four vulnerable mid-size 
American cities, and elaborated upon one particular 
theory of recovery first proposed in 1985.11  The end 
result was a broadly descriptive model—portrayed 
as a pyramid--of how the long-term recovery process 
may function (see Figure 2).  In this section, we briefly 
discuss this model and illustrate it with examples 
from Joplin, Missouri and the first six months of its 
recovery from the devastating tornado of May 2011.  In 
the next section of this report, we will use this model 
to organize a menu of specific activities, programs and 
services that donors may wish to support.
a model for thinking about   DONOR SUPPORT FOR LONG-TERM RECOVERY
Long-Term Recovery Planning Pyramid
•Restoration of critical infrastructure
•Reconstruction of housing and other damaged structures
•Resuscitation of economy




•Continuity of public sector operations
•Obtaining/integrating external resources
•Processes for collective decision-making on resource 
allocation





•Committees and tasks forces
•Plans and guidance




Baseline administrative structure, 
processes, capacity and competence
•Political leadership and culture
•Economic anchors & vulnerabilities
•Federal & state policy
•Social and geographic factors 
•Communal experience and history
Contextual Factors/Background
Figure 2
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The foundation of the pyramid is a complex constel-
lation of contextual factors, unique in each locality, 
but including the political and social environment, the 
dynamics of the local and regional economy, cultural 
norms regarding cooperation and competition, and 
prior experience with major disruptive events.  In 
Joplin’s case, these would include (among many 
others) the Council-Manager form of municipal gov-
ernment and the method of electing Council members 
both from specific zones and at large; Joplin’s status 
as the economic hub of a multi-state region; a recent 
history with localized tornados and ice storms that 
resulted in an experienced coalition of non-profit 
organizations active in disasters; a long-established 
chamber of commerce with strong regional connec-
tions and experience in running economic develop-
ment programs; a public school system that recently 
had been engaged in a strategic planning process 
and major construction program; a large faith-based 
community that had established collaborative relation-
ships across its members and with the schools and 
municipal government; and the existence of two major 
not-for-profit health systems. 
As reflected in the next to bottom level of the pyramid, 
a community’s ability to utilize its recovery tools and 
capabilities effectively depends upon it having robust 
and highly competent administrative structure and 
processes in its day to day, normal operations.  A com-
munity that can effectively pursue complex but impor-
tant goals under ordinary conditions should have a 
better chance of rising to the extraordinary challenges 
posed by a disaster than a community that cannot.  
Before the tornado, Joplin city government had led 
efforts to revitalize the downtown.  The public school 
system had collaborated with churches and area busi-
nesses in a highly-regarded program called “Bright 
Futures” designed to increase high school graduation 
rates. The Joplin Area Chamber of Commerce was a 
productive economic development agent for the city 
and region, as well as a long-time recipient of 5-star 
accreditation from the United States Chamber of 
Commerce. For nearly 50 years, the Economic Security 
Corporation of Southwest Area had attracted millions 
of federal housing and social services dollars into 
Joplin.  Local churches and social service agencies had 
successfully mobilized resources to assist victims of 
several major ice storms and smaller tornados.  Just 
weeks before the May 2011 tornado, a local university 
with dormitory facilities, the local American Red Cross 
chapter and the city government had established a 
sheltering arrangement as a prudent preparation for 
a catastrophe nobody had reason to expect would 
actually occur.    
 
In this model, the middle level of the pyramid indicates 
that communities embarked upon recovery also need 
what we have called “recovery process infrastructure”-
-tools and capacities related to recovery that they will 
employ after a disaster and which may well remain 
latent until activated by a disaster.  This includes things 
such as legal authorities to temporarily suspend or 
selectively apply certain land use, environmental and 
administrative regulations; committees, task forces 
and other formal mechanisms to establish relation-
ships among diverse political actors; recovery plans 
and guidance documents; and mutual aid agreements 
and other memoranda of understanding. Like most 
other communities in the United States, Joplin had not 
invested in a diverse tool-kit specifically with recovery 
from a disaster in mind.  It had in place the previously-
mentioned sheltering agreement and the association 
of non-profits active in disasters. The local network of 
faith based organizations and their year-round mission 
activities represented a capacity that the churches 
could dramatically scale up following a disaster.
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Although few formal long-term recovery tools or 
mechanisms pre-dated the tornado, various members 
of the community rapidly put them in play after the 
fact.  This included the FEMA-supported “long term 
community recovery” process through a “Citizens 
Advisory Recovery Team,” a housing needs study 
commissioned by the City Manager, a regional jobs 
recovery and expansion initiative spearheaded by the 
chamber of commerce, and a request for statements 
of interest from potential master developers.  Various 
new funds and foundations were established to 
facilitate the collection of external recovery assistance 
dollars, and Missouri state government promptly allo-
cated both low income housing tax credits and state 
business income tax credits in order to help direct 
private sources of capital towards Joplin’s recovery. 
 
According to the model, the achievement of the 
results that people care about most (shown at the 
peak) depends upon a set of “instrumental outcomes” 
shown in the second level from the top.  These are 
outcomes that don’t factor directly (or perhaps even 
consciously) into the way individuals, families, house-
holds and social groups think about their well-being.  
For example, in order to ultimately get new housing 
and jobs, to repair infrastructure and to create an 
environment that citizens accept and remain bonded 
to, there must be continuity of the public sector.  An 
impaired or incapacitated local government can’t 
manage debris removal, engage with the public in 
a goal-setting process, work with state and federal 
government to get tax credits and grants, or evaluate 
competing re-development proposals.  
The community also must have a variety of ways to 
bring in external resources to replace what the disaster 
has stripped away, and an environment that supports 
households, businesses and community organizations 
in making their independent decisions to remain, 
rebuild and reinvest.  This does not necessarily mean 
that government must subsidize or attempt to steer 
such individual decisions in a particular direction.  At 
a minimum, though, government must consciously 
consider how actions it takes in the aftermath of 
disasters may complicate, impede or delay rebuilding 
and investment decisions that individual actors wish 
to make.  Ideally, local government should take steps 
to simplify the process for those that are ready, willing 
and able to act.
The City of Joplin supported its citizens’ and busi-
nesses’ desires to rebuild first and foremost by 
removing the rubble in record time and promptly 
A community that can success-
fully pursue complex goals under 
ordinary circumstances should 
have a better chance of recovering 
than communities lacking such 
competence.
To be ready to pursue recovery 
when disaster strikes, communities 
need to have pre-existing, latent 
tools and capacities that they can 
activate immediately.
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lifting the initial short-term construction moratorium 
area by area as debris removal progressed.  The 
leaders of the public schools and of the two major 
health systems, through early and dramatic decisions 
to reopen, rebuild and scale up, did everything in their 
power to instill confidence that recovery would occur 
rapidly and to encourage fence-sitters to reinvest in 
homes and businesses in Joplin. The diverse com-
munity actors who contributed to the Citizens Advisory 
Recovery Team process of setting long term recovery 
goals completed their exercise in barely four months 
under very difficult conditions. 
The pinnacle of the pyramid represents the “ultimate 
recovery outcomes” in which planners, policy-
makers and citizens are interested. These include 
the reconstruction of housing, restoration of critical 
infrastructure like schools, transportation and health 
care facilities, revitalization of the local economy and 
replenishment of lost jobs, and the attainment of good 
physical, mental and emotional health. These elements 
all are necessary in order for people who have lived 
through disasters to return to some degree of nor-
malcy, stability and acceptance. 
This framework of long-term recovery is predicated 
upon the assumption that a community that articulates 
where it hopes a recovery process will lead and the 
kinds of ultimate recovery outcomes it hopes to attain, 
will be more likely to engage in coordinated and 
integrated post-disaster activities than a community 
that isn’t explicit about its goals.  It also reflects 
the assumption that a community that has a strong 
foundation--a resilient economic base, an amenable 
political culture, competent and effective organizations 
and leaders, and a tradition of cooperation and col-
laboration across sectors—and the tools and capacities 
to keep all sectors operating post-disaster and to 
gather community input and build consensus, will be 
more likely to articulate its recovery objectives.   In 
Joplin, the CART distilled thousands of pieces of citizen 
input into a precise, concrete, and achievable set of 
objectives for local government, the school system, 
the public health system, the business community, the 
local non-profit network and faith-based organizations.  
Although Joplin’s long-term recovery from a disaster 
that displaced close to one third of its population is 
just beginning, these CART recommendations already 
have influenced specific public and private decisions 
about the selection of a “master developer,” zoning 
and land use changes, allocation of low income 
housing tax credits, and the disbursement of grants 
from some of the philanthropic funds established by 
donors after the tornado. 
Instrumental Recovery Outcomes 
make it possible to attain the jobs, 
housing, functioning schools and 
infrastructure, good physical and 
mental health, and other results 
that make the various sectors in a 
community feel truly “recovered.”
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The National Disaster Recovery Framework promul-
gated by FEMA in September 2011 (NDRF) emphasizes 
the importance of what FEMA has come to call the 
“Whole Community” approach to recovery, in which 
all sectors of society pitch in and contribute human 
and financial resources instead of relying primarily 
upon the federal government.12  To this end, the NDRF 
goes to great lengths to describe roles and responsi-
bilities of individuals and households, businesses and 
the nonprofit sector, as well as those of government.    
While acknowledging the “formidable value of the 
work” of the nonprofit sector, NDRF describes a very 
traditional set of recovery roles for this sector.  Those 
roles generally fall under the rubric of “fill[ing] gaps 
where government authority and resources cannot be 
applied” and “implement[ing] an inclusive, locally-led 
recovery organization and process…as Federal and 
State recovery support recede and local leadership 
and community recovery organizations complete the 
mission.”13  NDRF does not discuss any unique roles 
for donors.
University of North Carolina professor Gavin Smith’s 
comprehensive and up-to-date book Planning for 
Post-Disaster Recovery: A Review of the United States 
Disaster Assistance Framework, describes how founda-
tions have supported disaster recovery by keeping 
local NGOs fiscally and managerially solvent during 
periods of immense financial and operational stress.  
Smith also emphasizes the roles foundations have 
played as conduits for financial assistance and relief 
supplies, as advocates for particular constituencies, 
as policy experts and as funders of disaster research 
and program evaluation.14  However, Smith’s book also 
devotes little attention to potential innovative roles for 
donors.  
In this section, we identify eight broad categories of 
activities, tools, programs or services that should be 
high priorities for donors wishing to help communities 
recover from disasters already sustained, or to prepare 
to recover from disasters feared.  Several examples are 
provided for each category, and a full list of potential 
donor activities is included as Table 1.  Our assignment 
of donor options to these eight categories is somewhat 
arbitrary, as some items arguably should be in more 
than one.  Table 1 also indicates the time periods—
before a disaster, after a disaster or both—when a 
donor could meaningfully support such an activity.  
1. Build trust and break down barriers 
among stakeholders
One ubiquitous theme rises to the top in most discus-
sions of long term recovery, from the NDRF to FEMA’s 
“Whole Community” manifesto to NCDP’s four-city 
long term recovery study.  Namely, that it is critical 
that people be ready, willing and able to rely upon one 
another immediately once a disaster hits.  This means 
much more than merely engaging cautiously, guard-
edly and perhaps even suspiciously with people whom 
one barely knows.  It implies sufficient confidence and 
trust in another person to hand off a problem and walk 
away to do something else, with the expectation that 
the other person will act in a way that respects your 
interests and values.  Many have noted that after a 
disaster is not the time to try to begin forging relation-
ships of trust; almost by definition, breaking down 
barriers is something that must occur (and that donors 
should support) when a vulnerable community is not 
in crisis mode.
Building trust and breaking down barriers is as essen-
tial within sectors of the community as across them.  
Employees of diverse departments of a municipal or 
county government need to build relationships with 
each other as much as they do with local NGOs and 
business organizations.  The leaders of local govern-
ment need to cultivate relationships with the state and 
federal government staff upon whom they will rely if 
a time comes when they need federal recovery assis-
tance.  The various organizations in a local network
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of NGOs need to build relationships so that can build 
upon their respective strengths and not treat each 
other as competitors if a disaster occurs.    
 
It may not be feasible or realistic for a donor or any 
outside third party to attempt to create relationships of 
trust among diverse recovery stakeholders, but donors 
can prime the pump to encourage such relationships 
to emerge organically.  Specifically, donors can design, 
support and offer various opportunities for local actors 
to come together, including:
 Generic (i.e., not related to recovery matters) expe-
riences in team-building and collaborative problem 
solving such as organizations across all sectors use 
to improve performance; 
 Opportunities for parties that are relatively inex-
perienced in recovery issues and NDRF principles 
to observe and/or participate in functional and 
tabletop exercises where they can begin to forge 
relationships with those with whom they’d need to 
work following a disaster; 
 Workshops focused on limited but perennial areas 
of recovery conflict, such as between planners and 
development interests over public discussion of 
hazards or mitigation measures that potentially 
could impair real estate or business values.
 Online and social opportunities for members of 
an emerging recovery constituency to stay in 
touch and strengthen relationships beyond formal 
training (see Box 4, Tri-State VOAD Conference). 
2. Promote stakeholders’ understand-
ing of their risks and exposures
As noted previously, many local leaders may not fully 
appreciate what their exposures might be—their insur-
ance gaps, their infrastructure deterioration or their 
economic vulnerabilities—should a disaster strike.  
This limits a community’s ability to make appropriate 
trade-offs and decisions.  Donors cannot force a 
clearer understanding of risks and exposures upon 
local leaders who, for political reasons, may not want 
to have that information (or want others to have it).  In 
most communities, however, many parties will be very 
eager to have such knowledge. In particular, donors 
can:
 Provide subsidized, independent assessments by 
qualified professionals of uncovered catastrophic 
exposures, hidden infrastructure deficiencies, and 
local and regional economic drivers.
 Support NGOs’ and faith-based organizations’ 
efforts to analyze their own vulnerabilities to opera-
tional disruptions from disasters (see “Strengthen 
and build networks of NGOs and Faith-Based 
Organizations.”) 
3. Help state and local actors integrate 
into the National Disaster Recovery 
Framework
After the federal government promulgated the National 
Incident Management System and the National 
Response Framework roughly a decade ago, state and 
local governments across the United States began to 
adapt their local emergency management structures to 
the emerging federal structures.  Similar adaptations 
are likely to occur in response to the National Disaster 
Recovery Framework, but with one major difference.  
Emergency services/emergency management is a 
routine function of virtually all states and local govern-
ments in the nation.  Even where it is nothing more 
than the local sheriff or fire department, emergency 
response receives a base level of funding from various 
levels of government regardless of whether or not 
there is a disaster.  
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Disaster recovery, on the other hand, doesn’t corre-
spond closely to any routine, ordinary function of local 
government.  Absent federal funding to hire specialists 
for pre-disaster recovery planning, cities, counties and 
states are going to need help figuring out how to pig-
gyback that function onto routine, funded functions of 
government without overburdening or compromising 
those routine activities. 
FEMA has begun the process of developing detailed 
guidance for the local public sector on how to fulfill 
its roles and responsibilities under the NDRF.  It has 
circulated a preliminary draft of a document known as 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 102, and it 
has commissioned the American Planning Association 
to update the classic volume that FEMA and APA col-
laboratively produced 15 years ago, entitled Planning 
for Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction.15  These 
FEMA efforts, however, do not make donors super-
fluous by any means. Donors can:
 Create or support tools and training resources that 
supplement whatever FEMA ultimately may decide 
to provide for the benefit of the local public sector.
 Subsidize the participation of the non-profit, faith-
based and business sectors in collaborative efforts 
with FEMA to develop comparable guidance on 
fulfilling their respective NDRF roles.
 Create or support tools and training specifically 
designed for state government level officials, who 
have unique roles to play in the NDRF as conduits 
and coordinators of federal assistance to stricken 
localities.
 Provide similar support for state health and educa-
tion departments, upon which local health depart-
ments and school districts are heavily dependent 
during recovery.
4. Allow all interested local, state, and 
federal parties to maximize resources 
brought to bear
Community members’ lack of a common awareness 
of the resources available to support recovery, both 
within the community and from various levels of 
government and donors, is a huge impediment to 
recovery.  Gavin Smith points out that in most disaster 
contexts, the universe of people and organizations 
with resources that they could contribute to recovery is 
not networked in any meaningful way. They don’t know 
the others exist, or if they do, they play by different 
rules, they don’t coordinate, they don’t have relation-
ships, they duplicate effort and they forego opportuni-
ties.  All of these failures repeatedly and predictably 
lead to disaster assistance being wasted, underutilized 
or used inefficiently.16   
As mobilizing and deploying resources to replace or 
restore what a disaster has destroyed is the essence of 
recovery, donors should focus on ways to facilitate that 
process:
 Donors can fund the development and ongoing 
maintenance of a unique software application that 
incorporates all the forms and procedures for the 
major government assistance programs. Local 
leaders in post-disaster settings have viewed run-
ning the federal assistance gauntlet as one of the 
most opaque and frustrating ordeals they’ve ever 
faced. In the past, American households and busi-
nesses almost universally viewed filing income tax 
returns the same way. Yet software companies have 
captured the entire Internal Revenue Code (and 44 
states’ overlapping tax laws and regulations) in 
user-friendly applications that millions of American 
households and businesses now use routinely.  If 
smart programmers and subject matter experts can 
tame the income tax process, they possibly can
DISASTER RECOVERY: GUIDANCE FOR DONORS 20
options FOR DONORS 
cont’d
do the same for the process of seeking recovery 
assistance. As no individual community or busi-
ness will be able to justify the costs of developing 
such software, doing so is an ideal opportunity for 
donors.    
 Donors also can fund a “situational awareness” 
tool that disaster-impacted localities can use to 
see the big picture of the resources that are avail-
able and latent in their community.  One existing 
product, the Center for Effective Philanthropy’s 
“Strategy Landscape,” may offer instructive 
insights on how to pursue such a tool.17
 Donors can directly subsidize VOADs, other NGOs 
and faith-based organizations that have predict-
able long-term post-disaster roles serving as case 
managers, and marshaling and distributing mas-
sive quantities of survival necessities, household 
goods, building supplies and volunteer labor of all 
kinds.  These organizations can more effectively 
fulfill these roles with inexpensive capital infusions 
to acquire extra temporary staff, warehouse space, 
trucks and communications equipment.
 Donors can provide seed funding for the organiza-
tion and capitalization of “social impact” financial 
mechanisms such as those created in Los Angeles 
in the late 1990s following a series of major mili-
tary base closures and the Northridge earthquake 
(see Box 1). 
 Donors also can make subordinated investments 
in social impact financial vehicles, such as the New 
York City Acquisition Loan Fund, LLC. 
5. Provide coaching for local leadership
In the aftermath of a disaster, local leaders (especially 
those for whom it is a first-of-its-kind experience) can 
feel an overwhelming burden. It is a challenge for 
which all of their professional experience and training 
is at best an approximation.  They are confronted with 
a seemingly endless series of urgent decisions at a 
time when they likely do not have access to their full 
staff or full complement of organizational resources.  
Local revenues also may be radically impaired for an 
extended period. This burden is vastly compounded 
if leaders personally have experienced the death or 
injury of a relative, friend or loved one, or substantial 
damage to their home, neighborhood or business. 
 Donors can organize and sustain a flexible national 
network of “recovery coaches.” The network could 
include a core of individuals who had lived and 
worked through major disasters themselves in 
positions of significant leadership and respon-
sibility, supported by a roster of subject matter 
experts who previously had consulted on recovery 
efforts following major disasters.   
  Donors could make the coaches available to local 
leaders--not just public officials, but leaders in any 
sector who are bearing  a large share of the burden 
of reviving a traumatized community--for a year 
or even longer, depending upon the local leaders’ 
wishes.  Coaches would provide customized assis-
tance tailored to how each impacted community 
defines its own needs. 
  The coaches would have the credibility to serve 
as a sounding board and source of feedback and 
encouragement for local leaders currently con-
fronting unfamiliar and daunting challenges, and 
desiring some validation of their judgments and 
assessment of problems.  If the local leaders opted 
to deploy them this way, the coaches also could 
provide some much needed “bench strength” on 
specific recovery tasks.
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BOX 1: MAXIMIZING RESOURCES -  THE GENESIS LA FAMILY OF FUNDS
Genesis LA Economic Growth Corporation, created in 1998 under the leadership 
of former Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan, has sponsored a series of invest-
ment vehicles designed to help direct private capital towards lower income com-
munities in southern California.  
“We strive to provide greater social and economic opportunity by bridging the 
chasm between the real estate capital markets, community development orga-
nizations and government entities. Through such partnerships, we have created 
a new hybrid model of community development, which ensures that all project 
participants benefit: empowering local stakeholders, ensuring financial returns 
for investors, and creating new opportunities for underdeveloped communities.”1 
Through professionally managed funds (the Genesis LA Real Estate Funds, which 
focus on economic development and job creation and the Genesis Workforce 
Housing Funds, which focus on “middle-income housing and neighborhood re-
tail”),2 and the self-managed 130 million Genesis LA Community Development 
Entity New Markets Tax Credits  program,3 Genesis LA has marshaled more than 
$500 million to support its mission.
Setting up the Genesis LA funds required specialized expertise and cost approxi-
mately $500,000.  Donors provided the funds to accomplish this ($200K from the 
city of Los Angeles and $300K from local banks).4  That initial donor support ulti-
mately leveraged $1000 of investment for every dollar of seed money.
1 http://www.genesisla.org/pdf/Genesis_LA_brochure_for_website.pdf
2 Shamrock Capital and PRG disclosures, available at http://www.shamrock.com/real_estate.html and  
http://www.phoenixrg.com/news/item.php?id=371, respectively.
3 http://www.genesisla.org/fund.php?nav=6
4 NCDP conversation with Deborah La Franchi, 4/2012.
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6. Support catalytic projects
Many local leaders believe that high visibility projects 
can contribute to recovery by fostering optimism and 
pride, eliciting positive media coverage and external 
funding, and encouraging displaced residents and 
businesses to hang tough and stay in the area until 
a tangible recovery milestone has been completed.  
Examples include the early commitment by the major 
universities in New Orleans to reopen for classes in 
January 2006, and the early decision by the Sisters of 
Mercy Health System to build a new hospital in Joplin, 
Missouri after the May 2011 tornado destroyed Mercy’s 
local hospital. (See Box 2 regarding the decision to 
start the 2011-2012 Joplin school year on time despite 
the loss of many facilities).
 Donors can support local leaders daring enough 
to make major early commitments and increase 
their chances of delivering on those promises. For 
some leaders, the most useful form of support 
will be financial support to bring on board on a 
short-term basis (3-4 months) a highly valued 
person whom the leader believes has the expertise 
to move the project forward.  For other leaders, 
access to specialized technical, engineering or 
legal expertise may be the most critical need. Still 
others may value assistance in public communica-
tions and mobilizing citizen engagement the most.  
Coaches such as those described above, could help 
local leaders refine their assessments of the kind 
of donor support that would be most helpful for 
pulling off for a catalytic project. 
7.  Strengthen and build networks of 
NGOs and Faith-Based Organizations 
Active in Recovery
Donors are used to working with major relief organiza-
tions like the American Red Cross, Catholic Charities 
and United Way, as well as countless smaller and 
specialized NGOs and faith-based organizations, to 
deliver shelter and other crisis assistance.  But these 
not-for-profit organizations often take on critical tasks 
in long-term recovery as well. They act as the case 
managers for Stafford Act Individual Assistance and 
for a wealth of assistance generated in or by the 
community and administered by community organiza-
tions. They also recruit volunteers, obtain donations 
from their members and affiliates, house and feed 
volunteers and people who are displaced, and provide 
household goods, food, clothes, furniture, appliances, 
and cleaning supplies. They even provide clean-up 
crews, building materials and skilled construction 
labor, all above and beyond what disaster victims 
receive from government and all for free. They are 
major rebuilders of housing and major providers of 
mental health services. Donors can support this critical 
infrastructure by helping to ensure that non-profits and 
NGOs themselves are resilient in the face of certain 
kinds of natural hazards, and by enhancing their ability 
to collaborate with each other (see Box 3). Specifically 
donors can:
 Create, nurture and/or fund local NGOs such 
as San Francisco CARD (Community Agencies 
Responding to Disaster) to promote widespread 
adoption by local non-profits and faith-based 
organizations of existing preparedness standards 
and to provide preparedness training.  Simply 
increasing the likelihood that non-profit networks 
will survive major disasters would be a major 
contribution to the success of long-term recovery.
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options FOR DONORS 
BOX 2: SUPPORTING CATALYTIC PROJECTS - 
 
STARTING JOPLIN’S SCHOOL YEAR ON TIME AFTER  THE TORNADO
Less than 48 hours after an EF-5 tornado had destroyed six of the Joplin Schools’ 
ten school buildings, Dr. C.J. Huff, the superintendent, announced that the public 
schools would reopen for the 2011-12 school year on schedule, just 85 days later.    
Through the Herculean efforts of the school staff, volunteers and business and 
non-profit organizations, Huff and his team met their deadline with a 95% stu-
dent retention rate.5 Many in Joplin viewed this decision as something that not 
only motivated high levels of community participation in recovery-related efforts, 
but also kept many people from moving out of the area.6    
A year later, Huff mentioned two ways that donors could have significantly in-
creased the likelihood of reopening the schools on time.7 First, funding tempo-
rary finance staff to work with the local assessor on managing the mid-long term 
implications of the tornado’s tremendous hit to the schools’ property tax base. 
That would have freed up the school system’s CFO to focus on a host of crisis 
problems. Second, providing resources and expertise to manage an abundance 
of restricted donations that Joplin Schools were delighted to receive, but that 
likewise diverted staff from the problems with the shortest fuse.
5 NCDP Huff interview 12/2011.
6 NCDP Ducre and Knutzen interviews 12/2011.
7 NCDP conversation with CJ Huff 7/2012.
 Convene regional meetings of NGOs and support 
existing efforts of VOADs designed to increase 
coordination and minimize duplication of effort 
during recovery among NGOs of differing scale, 
resources and orientation. (See Box 4, Tri-State 
VOAD Conference). 
 Act as a local sponsor and/or host of efforts to 
create and sustain a dialogue on recovery issues 
among local NGOs and the other recovery stake-
holders, equivalent to the Orfalea Foundation’s 
“Aware and Prepare Initiative” in Santa Barbara 
County, California or the Northern California 
Grantmakers’ “Disaster Preparedness and 
Response Initiative.”18    
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options FOR DONORS 
cont’d
BOX 3: STRENGTHENING AND BUILDING  NETWORkS OF NGOS AND FBOS—  
ORFALEA FOUNDATION’S AWARE & PREPARE INITIATIVE
In 2008, in response to various concerns about how well the Santa Barbara area 
could respond to a natural disaster of a scale comparable to Hurricane Katrina, 
The Orfalea Foundation created the “Aware & Prepare Initiative: A Community 
Partnership to Strengthen Emergency and Disaster Readiness.”8     
During previous wildfire emergencies in Santa Barbara County, NGOs that serve 
a significant population of vulnerable constituencies—lower income, non-English 
speakers, homeless, people with disabilities—had been severely handicapped by 
the absence of Spanish language media or Spanish “reverse 9-1-1,” limited Eng-
lish-Spanish translations for official communications, overtaxed staff and finan-
cial resources, a relatively inactive county-level VOAD, and poor relations with 
both city and county emergency management officials. A number of the NGOs 
lacked any planning for how to serve their constituency during an emergency or 
how to ensure their own survival.
To begin addressing these issues, Orfalea organized a regular series of meet-
ings among NGOs and the County OES, reinvigorated the Santa Barbara County 
VOAD and arranged for NGO representation in the County’s Emergency Opera-
tions Center. Orfalea also helped increase the level of coordination regarding 
disaster readiness among local donors. ”Since its inception, Aware & Prepare has 
been supported by a collaborative of funders including the Orfalea Foundation, 
the Santa Barbara Foundation, James S. Bower Foundation, Wood-Claeyssens 
Foundation, Outhwaite Charitable Trust, Hotchkis Family Foundation and the 
Fund for Santa Barbara. It is Aware & Prepare’s goal to have all local funding for 
emergency readiness coordinated with the strategy and priorities set forth by 
the Emergency Managers Committee in Santa Barbara County and the Voluntary 
Organizations Active in Disasters.”9   
8 http://www.orfaleafoundation.org/partnering-impact/aware-prepare/key-elements-aware-prepare
9 http://www.orfaleafoundation.org/partnering-impact/aware-prepare/orfalea-involvement-and-evaluation
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8. Provide Practice and Thought 
Leadership for Recovery as a Critical 
Component of Disaster Philanthropy
The future will offer numerous opportunities for 
donors, acting independently or through a national 
resource organization, to take a direct leadership role 
in accelerating recovery from specific disasters.  
 
 Donors, particularly those who are not major 
political actors in a stricken community, have a 
unique ability to act as honest brokers, facilitators, 
and conveners and to create momentum in an 
environment when energy, creativity and flexibility 
already are stretched to their limit. 
 As highlighted in a seminal article on effective 
disaster philanthropy released in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina, donors can make widely 
available multiple modalities--webinars, interac-
tive websites, social media, breakfast meetings, 
funders-only conclaves—of exchanging informa-
tion between the donor world and localities 
seeking recovery assistance.19
They also can provide support to codify an increasing 
body of evidence and experience about the most effec-
tive ways to mobilize and manage volunteers, and how 
to apply the economic value ascribed to volunteerism 
to meeting a local matching share for federal assis-
tance under the Stafford Act and other laws.  
Independent of an actual disaster situation, donors 
also can fund research on some of the big, as yet unan-
swered questions about how recovery occurs.  Table 1 
includes suggested topics.
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cont’d
BOX 4: 2011 LOUISIANA-MISSISSIPPI-ALABAMA  TRI-STATE VOAD CONFERENCE
In mid-November 2011, with more than $400,000 of support from the Baton 
Rouge Area Foundation, the Louisiana Voluntary Organizations Active in Disas-
ters convened the first of what is intended to be an ongoing series of conferenc-
es with its sister organizations along the Gulf Coast.  This three day gathering at-
tracted approximately 250 leaders from organizations that are active in the three 
states’ VOADs, along with representatives from the federal government, universi-
ties and other organizations that are not active members of a VOAD.
Headlined as “Because Disasters Know No Boundaries,” the conference’s goal 
was to begin “to address persistent gaps in response and preparedness with up-
date response strategies,” and towards that end it “featured national and region-
al disaster experts in roundtable discussions, plenary and breakout sessions, and 
five training courses.”10   The event also provided many structured and informal 
opportunities for networking both within and across state, including an “evening 
event with food and entertainment.”  Among attendees who returned completed 
evaluations, the networking opportunities received the highest grades of all 
components of the conference.11
10 http://lavoad.org/featured/tri-state-voad-because-disasters-know-no-boundaries-conference-evaluation/
11 Tulane University’s Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy, 2011, Because Disasters Know No Boundaries, 
2011 Tri-State Conference of Voluntary organizations Active in Disasters, Conference Evaluation, p1, http://
lavoad.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Tri-State-Because-Disaster-Know-No-Boundaries-Conference-
Evaluation-2011.pdf
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1.  
ACTIVITIES, TOOLS, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES
BUILD TRUST AND BREAK DOWN BARRIERS AMONG STAKEHOLDERS
Organize and underwrite experiences in team-building and collaborative problem-
solving for stakeholders in government, NGO, faith-based and business sectors. 
Subsidize opportunities for parties inexperienced in recovery and NDRF principles 
to observe and/or participate in functional recovery exercises where they may 
begin to forge relationships.
Build bridges among planners and “pro-development” interests concerning 
public discussion of hazards or mitigation measures that potentially could impair 
real estate and business values.
Create opportunities for the trained parties to remain in informal contact via 
dedicated social networking products.
Provide funding for narrowly-focused projects undertaken collaboratively by local 
government, school systems, business organizations, foundations and faith based 
organizations.
Maintain online library of examples of non-disaster related collaborations.
Provide training and support to localities in managing media relations during 
recovery
PROMOTE STAKEHOLDERS’ UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR RISKS AND 
ExPOSURES
Provide subsidized independent risk management advice to enable NGOs, 
municipalities and businesses to get better information about their uncovered 
exposures.  
Provide subsidized independent engineering assessments of hidden infrastruc-
ture deficiencies and/or shortfalls in existing insurance for infrastructure damage.





TABLE 1 (CONTINUED).  
ACTIVITIES, TOOLS, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES
Provide subsidized independent analyses of regional economic drivers, to  
facilitate planning and decision-making to attract or keep businesses and make 
infrastructure investments.  
Support local NGO efforts to analyze their own vulnerability and resilience in the 
face of certain kinds of natural hazards
Support local NGO efforts to address underlying root causes of risk and vulner-
ability, and to “strengthen and amplify local organizing, social justice concerns 
and movement building.”20
HELP STATE AND LOCAL ACTORS INTEGRATE INTO THE NDRF
Offer training to educate the non-profit, NGO, faith-based and business sectors 
about their designated roles in NDRF.
Subsidize non-governmental participation in the development of guides for the 
non-profit, NGO, faith-based and business sectors equivalent to Comprehensive 
Preparedness Guide 102.
Supplement FEMA-provided training for state government officials designated to 
perform the NDRF-mandated role of “State Disaster Recovery Coordinator.”
Develop training for state departments of health and departments of education in 
the extraordinary needs of municipal and county health departments and school 
boards during disaster recovery.
Support local government feedback on FEMA-generated guidance on how local 
governments can incorporate the NDRF into traditional, ongoing programs and 
planning activities.
PROVIDE TOOLS AND CAPITAL TO PROMOTE OPTIMAL USE OF LOCAL AND 
ExTERNAL RESOURCES
Tools
Commission and maintain in updated form, a computer application to enable 
applicants for all categories of federal recovery assistance to correctly navigate 
the federal application process.





TABLE 1 (CONTINUED).  
ACTIVITIES, TOOLS, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES
Commission customizable templates for localities to use in assembling invento-
ries of recovery-related physical and human assets.  
Offer impacted localities a “situational awareness” tool to provide a comprehen-
sive and dynamic picture of the recovery efforts occurring across the broader 
Create a national inventory and online portal to free or low-cost tools to improve 
Continuity of Operations procedures for small and medium businesses
Develop innovative approaches to post-disaster donor due diligence of NGOs, 
when local non-profit organizations are least capable of diverting resources to 
educating donors.
Capital
Subsidize acquisition of temporary paid staff, warehouse space, trucks, and 
communications equipment.by organizations that marshal and distribute large 
Provide seed capital to support the organization and capitalization of “social 
impact” financial mechanisms to induce private funding for housing, economic 
development and health facilities.
Make subordinated capital investments in “social impact” financial vehicles.
Nurture a local foundation that could assume some critical roles that other local 
actors may be ill-prepared to handle during a disaster.  
Subsidize multi-sector support for FEMA’s development of an “integrated case 
management tool.”
PROVIDE COACHING AND SUPPORT FOR CATALYTIC PROJECTS
Organize and sustain a flexible national pool of “recovery coaches” consisting of 
alumni of major disasters and highly qualified subject matter experts.
Provide disaster-impacted localities free and sustained access to Recovery 
Coaches for at least 6-12 months.  
Provide financial and/or staff support to help a local leader (in any sector) deliver 
on a commitment she or he has made to a publicly-announced, high profile 
recovery project.





TABLE 1 (CONTINUED).  
ACTIVITIES, TOOLS, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES
Support the creation of tools such as land-banking to help localities address 
the speed vs. deliberation conundrum and other complications posed by “time 
compression.” 
Support governmental and NGO efforts to track evacuees, extend services to 
them regionally and facilitate their repatriation
STRENGTHEN AND BUILD NETWORKS OF NGOs and FAITH-BASED 
ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN RECOVERY
Improve coordination among the national and local level NGOs likely to be active 
following disasters.
Create and/or fund local VOADs and other entities to support preparedness and 
recovery training for NGOs.
Develop preparedness standards to help ensure that NGOs and faith based orga-
nizations survive disasters and are able to perform their critical roles in long-term 
recovery.
Support local efforts to prepare the philanthropic sector to survive and recover 
from a major disaster, similar to the Northern California Grantmakers’ Bay Area 
Disaster Preparedness and Response Initiative
Practice Leadership
Provide independent and politically neutral encouragement to convene local 
leaders, help identify priorities and needs, forge relationships and incubate cata-
lytic projects.
Offer multiple modalities of exchanging information between the donor world 
and localities seeking recovery assistance. 
Support efforts to promulgate national standards for volunteer organiza-
tion behavior in conjunction with FEMAcorps, Americorps, and the National 
Emergency Management Association
Thought Leadership





TABLE 1 (CONTINUED).  
ACTIVITIES, TOOLS, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES
Support efforts to capture, document and disseminate information about what 
recovery activities have worked and not worked in prior disasters.
            
Assess whether “pilot programs” (unrelated to disasters) that the philanthropic 
sector has incubated and “handed off” to the public sector, offer models that 
could be developed for recovery.
Document cases of the philanthropic sector successfully advocating policy 
reforms outside the disaster sector that potentially could be applicable to piece-
meal Stafford Act reform.
Commission a study of best practices in managing the consequences of mass 
population displacement and out-migration following a disaster.
Explore whether micro-credit and micro-insurance products can mitigate antici-
pated increasing loss exposures for individuals, households and businesses.
Examine the nexus of disaster philanthropy and “impact investing,” i.e., investing 
donor capital for a return of principal, a “social” impact and possibly a below-
market financial return. 
Explore with the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) whether disaster 
recovery can be incorporated into GIIN’s “Impact Reporting and Investment 
Standards” (IRIS).
Determine whether so-called “hybrid value chains” or “social impact bonds” 
might be useful recovery tools following domestic disasters. 
Examine whether it is feasible to utilize challenges and innovation prizes to  
generate solutions to complex recovery problems.  
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